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2 edition of Co-optation, repression and authoritarian regime"s survival found in the catalog.

Co-optation, repression and authoritarian regime"s survival

Noura Hamladji

Co-optation, repression and authoritarian regime"s survival

the case of the Islamist MSP-Hamas in Algeria

by Noura Hamladji

  • 229 Want to read
  • 15 Currently reading

Published by European University Institute in Badia Fiesolana, San Domenico (FI) .
Written in English

    Subjects:
  • Authoritarianism -- Algeria.,
  • Islam and politics -- Algeria.,
  • Cooptation -- Algeria.

  • Edition Notes

    Includes bibliographical references.

    StatementNoura Hamladji.
    SeriesEUI working paper -- no.2002/7
    ContributionsEuropean University Institute. Department of Political and Social Sciences.
    The Physical Object
    Pagination28 p. ;
    Number of Pages28
    ID Numbers
    Open LibraryOL16330202M

    The Rentier State. To study the more profound effects of democratic sanctions, we also tested whether democratic sanctions are associated with a higher rate of regime change and ruler exit. If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form. Degradations of democracy happen in a number of areas, primarily in terms of the competitiveness of elections, government accountability, and civil and political liberties. The first lesson, then, is not to obey in advance. Few authoritarian regimes—be they communist, fascist, corporatist, or personalist—have managed to conduct orderly, peaceful, timely, and stable successions".

    Within democracies, parties serve to coordinate the pursuit of interests for like-minded citizens, whereas in authoritarian systems, they are a way for authoritarian leaders to find capable elites for the regime. Movements that devise and sequence a broad repertoire of tactics, including those that bring people together for concentrated actions rallies, sit-ins, blockades and those that involve dispersed acts of resistance consumer boycotts, stay-aways, go slow tacticsare more likely to endure and grow. Thus, the choice of the Socialist party to participate backfired on the party itself, as its experience in power discredited it even further with the electorate. Key figures in the associational movement in Casablanca gave the same type of answer. In a sense, permitting a degree of pluralism and therefore a confrontation of policies and ideas allows the Monarchy to be the ultimate decisionmaker because the different parties are unable to reach a compromise on a number of issues due to their lack of control on the levers of power. The researchers found that in the wake of the Arab uprisings, rulers have learned from each other and exploited their linkages as regards various strategies for maintaining power, notably repressive tactics.

    And there is more bad news. Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. This is demonstrated by an influential body of scholarship using elections as the defining property e. Thereby, the question of democratic sanction effectiveness has been left largely unanswered.


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Co-optation, repression and authoritarian regimes survival book

Academic research has shown that sanctions are not only ineffective, but even counterproductive. For most people with even a slight interest in international politics, it is not particularly hard to find examples to support a generally sceptic view of sanctions as a tool for external democracy promotion.

Authoritarians increasingly seek to create an appearance of good performance, conceal state repression, and imitate democracy.

If citizens conclude the dictator is incompetent, they overthrow him in a revolution. Publications by Author. When we look specifically at democratic sanctions, we observe much clearer positive outcomes than for all international sanctions combined.

Political repression in autocratic regimes

The King therefore supports the Tariqa in order to strengthen his religious legitimacy and to have privileged access to the religious bourgeoisie that the association represents. Not only has Mohammed VI been able to lure Co-optation the political system a moderate Islamist party, but he also plays on the theological differences and personal rivalries that characterise two of the largest Islamist associations: the Jamiat al-adl led by Sheikh Yassine and the Tariqa Boutchichiya led by Sheikh Hamza.

Co-optation does not obviously equate with power sharing and it does not challenge the fundamentals of the political order because the real wielders of power remain in full control of the political agenda and of the state institutions. Beblawi, H and Luciani, G.

Carapico, S. We also show that democratic sanctions have other more profound effects on the targeted state. The most recent conference of the network was held in in Berlin. Fraudulent elections may serve the role of signaling the strength of the regime, repression and authoritarian regimes survival book well as force other elites to demonstrate their loyalty to the regime, whereas in democracies, free and fair elections are used to select representatives who represent the will of the citizens.

Both democratic backsliding and authoritarianization are evident, indicating a movement towards the erosion of democracy.

In our study on sanctions and democratization, we are therefore especially interested in the democratic effect of those sanctions that explicitly aim to increase the level of democracy in the targeted country. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 31 2pp. Holden, P. Table 2 shows a simplified presentation of the results by providing the average yearly change in democracy scores in countries targeted by different types of sanctions.

The most prominent forms of authoritarian politics found today are dictatorships of the military, dominant party and the personalist. Table 2: Mean yearly change in democracy scores according to different sanction goals. Cavatorta, F. By simply arguing that it is robust and efficient, we have the impression that we are dealing with societies where there is a high degree of continuous violence.

The ability of the Moroccan monarchy to play on the differences that characterise the political opposition is beyond doubt and is due mainly to the presence of political Islamism, which has a contentious and divisive nature.

Repression of protests is a substitute for all the other techniques. The regime and all the different opposition actors struggle to control the space civil society provides and the novelty of this analysis resides in the teasing out of how this struggle is occurring in the Moroccan context.

To study the more profound effects of democratic sanctions, we also tested whether democratic sanctions are associated with a higher rate of regime change and ruler exit. The clearest example of this is the strategy employed to exploit the differences that exist among Islamist associations.

This approach to democratisation argues that elections in authoritarian regimes constitute part of a metagame between ruling elites and opponents, which involves a competition for votes inside a larger competition over the nature of political power.

While this has been the case in Algeria since the cancellation of legislative elections in Januarythis is the exception rather than the rule and other countries in the region have at most only gone through sporadic periods of low-intensity conflict for instance Syria in the early s and Egypt in the early s and mid s or have known very little widespread violence such as Jordan or Morocco.

References[ edit ] Abdel-Latif, O.13 See Rebecca Fradkin, Authoritarian Regimes and the Co-optation of Islam: Kazakhstan and Russia (University of Oxford, ) for further analysis on how the co-optation of religion by authoritarian regimes differs from and is similar to the co-optation of other sources of potential opposition.

↝. This book provides a rare window into the micropolitics of contemporary authoritarian rule through a comparison of religious-state relations in Russia and China - two countries with long histories of religious repression, and even longer experiences with authoritarian sylvaindez.com by: Downloadable (with restrictions)!

Theoretical models on autocracies have long grappled with how to characterize and analyze state sponsorship of repression. Moreover, much of the existing formal literature sees dictators’ behavior as determined by one type of opposition actor alone and disregards the potential role played by other types of sylvaindez.com by: 5.

The Mexican political system has been pragmatic and moderately authoritarian sinceand based on institutions more than personalistic rule. The system has tended to be inclusionary, with co-optation and incorporation rather than exclusion of troublesome political forces.

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It. May 31,  · The most prominent forms of authoritarian politics found today are dictatorships of the military, dominant party and the personalist. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes have two broad tools of repression and co-optation to defend their rule.

However, authoritarian resilience is the function of continuous adaptative institutional changes/5(6). Apr 02,  · Repression, Political Threats, and Survival Under Autocracy - SSRN Electronic Journal. In-text Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and Their Leaders. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic regimes. Democratization, 20(1), pp Journal. Kailitz, S.